Posts in Economic Theory and Acadmics
Kinky economics - When must fiscal policy tighten to combat inflation?

The prevailing mood in global macro discussions seems to be as follows; inflation is past its peak, but it is set to remain a lot higher for a lot longer than initially anticipated, forcing central banks to continue hiking, keep rates higher for longer, or a combination of the two. The interest rate shock in the UK, as markets have adjusted their expectations for the BOE bank rate higher, and hawkish comments from the ECB are the two most obvious cases in point in developed markets. But a surprise hike by the Bank of Canada, and a larger-than-expected hike in Norway have added to the sentiment. We only really need the Fed to be forced into a hawkish turn to complete the narrative. This shift is important for investors. We are not just trying to calibrate when central banks will pause their hiking cycles—probably soon—but we’re also increasingly discussing, and pricing, how long rates will stay elevated, and whether central banks will have to resume hiking before they cut. Higher-for-longer, or #H4L, is already a trending hashtag on FinTwitter.

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The looming downturn in capex and the rise of EVs

I think Simon Ward is right to predict that a downturn in investment will be the next shoe to drop in developed market business cycles, even as easing inflation offers respite for households’ inflation-adjusted disposable income and spending. This has been a key theme for me and my colleagues at Pantheon Macroeconomics for a while. In the U.S., Ian Shepherdson believes that this will drive the economy into a mild recession, while we are a bit more sanguine in Europe for the simple reason that the euro area economy effectively has been close to recession since the end of last year. Simon Ward notes that the capital goods component of the global PMI hit a new low in April, that inflation-adjusted profits in G7 slowed sharply last year, and that nominal money is contracting. Crucially, he adds that credit standards are now tightening significantly in Europe, as well as across the pond. Flat-lining profits in inflation-adjusted terms, a contraction in nominal deposits, the lagged effect of higher interest rates and tightening credit standards is bad news for private capex, including inventories, as measured by the national accounts. The silver lining is that a slowdown in investment should, combined with softening inflation, persuade DM central banks to kick back from the table on rate hikes. The key question, however, remains whether a slowdown in investment and aggregate demand is adequately priced-in by equities. I doubt it.

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Can we pull off a soft landing?

Central bank hiking cycles in the developed world are slowly but surely coming to an end, raising the question of whether they have pulled off a soft landing, defined as a fall in inflation back towards target of around 2% without a meaningful decline in output and rising unemployment. On the face of it, the answer to this question is a resounding no. Interest rates in Europe, the UK and the US are up anywhere from 300 to 450bp in less than a year, driving up bond yields , and pushing yield curve inversions to near record levels. Anyone using these data points to predict what comes next, using historical relationships, will conclude that the wheels are about to come off in developed economies and their financials markets alike. The difficulties in the US regional banking sector is, in this case, simply a canary in the coal mine, warning of bigger shocks to come. The investment implications of such a view are simple; short equities and long short-term government bonds.

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China's Population

Last week we learned that China’s population shrunk last year, for the first time in 60 years, by 850K, the net result of 9.6M live births, and 10.4M deaths. It is worth taking these numbers with a pinch of salt. Accurately accounting for some 1.4B people is difficult, especially down to a sub-1M difference between deaths and births. It’s possible that future revisions will show that China’s population has been shrinking since the beginning of the 2020s, or that it won’t start shrinking until 2025 or beyond. What is clear for anyone with even cursory knowledge of Chinese demographics, however, is that this headline was coming sooner rather than later. China’s fertility rate has long since declined below the replacement level, and all-age mortality is now rising as the population ages. But does it matter that China’s population is now shrinking?

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